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preemptive right. The Model Business Corporation Act 2 § 24 on Share3
holders' Preemptive Rights may well serve as their guide.
JERRY M. MURRAY

A REVIEW OF PRESENT LAW ON THE ADMISSION
OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN OUR
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

There exists today, among state and federal courts, a divergence of
opinion as to the admissibility of evidence illegally1 obtained by state and
federal officials.
Illegally obtained evidence which is admissible in certain state courts
is inadmissible in others, and in our federal courts. Yet, evidence which is
inadmissible in a state court sometimes may be admissible in a federal
prosecution. The object of this article is to review the status of the law
as it now stands.
II.

ADMISSIBILITY

IN FEDERAL COURTS OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED BY FEDERAL OFFICERS

It is a well-settled general rule today that evidence illegally obtained
by federal officers is inadmissible in the federal courts.2 This so-called
"Exclusionary Rule" excludes any evidence obtained by unlawful search,
and also the oral evidence concerning what was found or seized while
the unlawful search was being conducted, together with the evidence
developed as a result.
There are different theoretical bases for the exclusion in federal courts
of illegally obtained evidence. Some courts appear to rely directly on the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 3 Other courts take the position
32.

Model Business Corporation Act, American Law Institute § 24 (1953).
"The
preemptive right of a shareholder to acquire unissued or treasury shares of a
corporation may be limited or denied to the extent provided in the articles of
incorporation.
Unless otherwise provided by its articles of incorporation, any corporation may
issue and sell its shares to its officers or employees or to the officers of employees
of any subsidiary corporation without first offering such shares to its shareholders,
for such consideration and upon such terms and conditions as shall be approved
by the holders of two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote thereon or by its board
of directors pursuant to like approval of the shareholders." See also, § 53, clause p,
for the right to amend articles to "limit, deny, or grant" preemptive rights.

1.

"Illegal" is used in this article to include any act prohibited by the federal or
state constitutions or any state or federal statutes.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1888); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34
S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ; a review of the
history of the Fourth Amendment will show that the founders of our nation felt
very strongly about the English practice of searching by writs of assistance. For
a discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment, see Boyd v. United States,
supra note 2.

2.
3.

167
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that the introduction of such evidence amounts to a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. In Agnello v. United States the court put it this way:
It is well settled that, when properly invoked, the Fifth
Amendment protects every person from incrimination by the use
made in violation
of evidence obtained through search or seizure
4
of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v .Wong Quong Wong 5 the court relied on both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments and held that these amendments protect
persons not only from self-incrimination and in this case the unreasonable
search and seizure of their private papers, but also against the use of such
unlawfully seized papers as evidence against them when a forfeiture of
property is involved. In Wolf v. Colorado6 Mr. Justice Black, in concurring, interprets the opinion of the majority as saying:
The federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth
Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate. (emphasis added) 7
Whatever the real basis, the rule stands today, the only question in
the federal courts being, (1) was it obtained illegally, and if so, (2) was
the evidence obtained by or with the connivance of a federal officer?
() In determining whether the evidence was illegally obtained, the
actions of law enforcement officials may be grouped under the following
broad headings: (a) Illegal search and seizure, (b) Evidence obtained
through coercion and unlawful detention, and (c) Information obtained
through wiretapping. These headings are not all-inclusive, but a complete discussion would necessitate a work beyond the scope of this note.
Each of these headings will now be discussed.
(a) Search and Seizure
In this area, the federal courts will admit evidence when secured
through a valid search warrant or pursuant to a lawful arrest.8 A wide
variety of facts and circumstances are constantly being brought before the
courts for a determination of whether the evidence offered has been
9
obtained through lawful search and seizure. In Grau v. United States
the petitioner was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing whiskey. Articles
offered in evidence at the trial were obtained through a search warrant.
The warrant was found to be void for failure to observe statutory requirements. The Court ruled that for this reason the admission of the articles
seized under this warrant as evidence was error, and reversed the judgment. In another instance the defendant was under surveillance for two
months prior to the time officers entered his room without a search war4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925).
94 Fed. 832 (D. Vt. 1899).
338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949).
Ibid at 39, 40.
Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653
A.L.R. 783.
287 U.S. 124, 53 S.Ct. 38, 77 L.Ed. 212 (1932).

(1950); 82
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rant. In this case the officers looked through a transom from the hallway
of a rooming house and observed the defendant engaged in operating a
lottery. Here again, since the entrance to the building and to the room
was made without an authorized search warrant, the evidence seized was
held to be inadmissible. 10 In United States v. Sipes," federal officers saw
the defendant, who had a reputation of being a bootlegger, walking on the
street wearing a bulging jacket. Based only on these two facts, the officers
searched the defendant without a warrant. The court held that the arrest
was illegal and that the evidence thus obtained was inadmissible. In
United States v. Rosenthal' 2 alcohol tax agents made a search and seizure
without a warrant. The court suppressed the evidence because there was
no showing that there was probable cause for believing an offense had been
committed by the defendant, hence his arrest was illegal.
In one situation, officers detected the odor of burning opium coming
from a hotel room. They entered without a search warrant, arrested the
only occupant, searched the room, and found opium. The court held there
were no exceptional circumstances here sufficient to justify the failure
of the officers to obtain a search warrant and that therefore the search
violated the Fourth Amendment and the conviction based on evidence thus
obtained could not be sustained.' 3
A comparatively new development in the law of search and seizure
has been the taking of substances or fluids of the body without the person's
consent. Formerly, the exclusionary rule seemed limited to oral or extrinsic evidence only, in a case such as Rochin v. California.'4 In discussing body examination the court, in Holt v. United States said ". . . the
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when
it may be material."' 5 The court of appeals of the District of Columbia held
an enlisted man may be ordered by his superiors to submit to a physical
examination for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of blood on his
body.1O
When the body is actually invaded, the problem is more complicated.
In United States v. Wills,' 7 stomach pumping, participated in by a federal
officer, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Although the
court strongly condemned the forcible use of a stomach pump in Re
Guzzardi,28 saying, in effect, the approval of such methods would mean a
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948).
132 F.Supp. 537 (U.S.D.C Tenn 1955).
116 F.Supp. 873.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).
218 U.S. 245, 252, 31 S.Ct. 2, 654 L.Ed. 1021 (1910).
United States v. McFarland, 150 F.2d 593, 80 App.D.C. 196 (1945).
85 F.Supp. 745 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1949).
84 F.Supp. 294 (D.C. Tex. 1949).

NoTEs
return to trial by ordeal, they nevertheless sustained the conviction because
it was shown there had been no.participation by a federal officer until after
the evidence in question had been recovered.
There is some recent authority that not all use of the accused's body
as a source of incriminating evidence will be regarded as an unreasonable
search and seizure even under the federal rule. In Novak v. District of
Columbia,19 a urine specimen, obtained from a person for the purpose
of an analysis for alcohol content, was held not to amount to an unlawful
search and seizure. It was shown that the officer did not inform the
defendant of his right to refuse, but the court pointed out that the defendant had been legally arrested and was being legally detained when
the specimen was taken. In Blackford v. United States20 the defendant
was stopped at the international boundary line in California by Customs
Officials. He was asked to remove his coat, whereupon puncture marks
were revealed in the veins of his arms. The inspectors then directed the
defendant to disrobe entirely, and upon his so doing, noticed a large
quantity of a greasy substance about his rectum. The defendant admitted
that he had heroin concealed in his rectum. He was then placed under
arrest and taken to a United States Naval hospital, where, despite his
denial and protest, the heroin was forcibly removed by medical personnel.
The court held that the search and seizure did not constitute a violation
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and did not fall under the "Rochin
Rule" as a denial of due process.
(b) Evidence Obtained Through Coercion and Unlawful Detention
The test for the admissibility of a confession is whether it was made
21
freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.
In Joseph v. United States, 2 2 the mere fact that a confession was obtained
before the defendant was taken before a commissioner was held not determinative of its admissibility. The court said the defendant must show that
23
the confession was involuntary. However, in Mallory v. United States,
the petitioner was arrested early one afternoon and not taken before a
magistrate until the next morning. During this time he was interrogated,
submitted to a lie detector test, and in the evening made a confession,
seven and one-half hours after his arrest. The court held this was a violation of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
requires that an arrested person be taken before a committing magistrate
"without unnecessary delay," and the conviction of rape in the Federal
District Court was reversed., In Brown v. United States2 4 the confessions
were allegedly obtained before prompt arraignment, but the court reasoned
19
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

160 F.2d 588, 80 App.D.C. 95 (Mun. Ct. App.D.C. 1946).
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) Cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
United States v. Echleles, 22 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1955).
239 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1957).
354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 479 (1957).
228 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1955).
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that because the allegedly unlawful detention was by state officers not acting
in collaboration with federal officers, the confession was admissible.
25

(c) Wiretapping
Wiretapping is a comparative newcomer to the field of search and
seizure. Prior to the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,20 the
majority view that the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment prohibited the taking of tangible things, and did not preclude testimony concerning voluntary conversations secretly overhead. 27 Wiretapping
is not a search and seizure in contravention of the Fourth Amendment,
and evidence received by this means would be admissible in the federal
courts were it not for the passage of Section 605.28 The Supreme Court,
however, apparently has taken the view that if the premises were unlawfully invaded in order to accomplish the wiretap, it would be inadmissible
in the federal courts without the application of Section 605.29 In Nardone
v. United States30 the Supreme Court decided that Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 applied to federal officers as well as
other persons and rendered such evidence inadmissible in a criminal trial.
On the second appeal of the Nardone case, the court held that Section 605
rendered inadmissible not only evidence of the conversations heard by
wiretapping but also evidence procurred or made accessible by the use of
that information.
A limitation upon the effect of Section 605 was imposed by Goldstein
v. United States3" where it was held that one not a party to the intercepted conversation has no standing to object to it being introduced in
evidence.
In cases in which there has been no interference with a communication
facility, the courts have held there is no violation of Section 605 or the
32
Fourth Amendment.
(2) In determining whether the evidence was "obtained" by a federal
3
officer, the courts have used such criteria as instigation by federal officers,'
34
This has been generalor co-operation by federal officers in the search.
5
In Lustiz v. United
in
it."
"a
hand
officer
had
a
federal
ized to whether
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Wiretapping as used in this article is a mechanical interception, somewhere between
the point of transmission and the point of reception.
Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605 reads in part as follows:
"... no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the meaning of such intercepted communication to any

person ... "
Note, 7 Wyo. L.J. 89, 91 (1953).
United States v. Coplan, 88 F.Supp. 921 (1950).
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942); see
Irving v. United States, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954).
302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937).
316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 1312 (1942).
Goldman v. United States and Shulman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct.
993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942).
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 S.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927).
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S.Ct. 248, 249, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927).
Ibid.

NOTES

States,3 6 a federal officer who helped in "sifting" the evidence, even though
he was not present when the room was entered, constituted having a "hand
in it" under the rule of the Byars3 7 case. If there is an agreement that local
officers are to make the unlawful search and seizure of evidence to be used
by the federal officers, the evidence obtained may be excluded.38
In Flagg v. United States3 9 the court found instigation by federal
officers simply because the plan was too elaborate and carefully prepared
to be attributed to a few local law enforcement officers.

III.

ADMISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURTS OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED

BY STATE OFFICERS

It can be generally stated that evidence which has been obtained by
state officers will be admitted in a federal court notwithstanding the fact
that it would have been illegal by federal standards, if there has been no
showing of federal instigation or participation, 40 and even though such
evidence would be inadmissible in the state court. This is based on the
holding that the Fourth Amendment has no application to State process. 41
Thus, it follows naturally that if the unreasonable search and seizure by a
state officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby
42
gained also does not.
It has been stated that such an exception induces police lawlessness
by encouraging federal officers to employ state officers to make illegal search
and seizures so that the federal exclusionary rule may be circumvented. 43
How much of this is done is speculative, but it is carried on to a considerable extent. 44 There are many areas where state and federal crimes overlap,
such as interstate transportation of stolen 'goods, or vehicles, 45 interstate
white slave traffic, 46 possession or sale of narcotics 47 and others. In our
modern-day law enforcement, much co-operation does and should exist,
but the courts seemingly have drawn fine lines as to the admissibility of
such evidence.
As stated earlier, the court in the Flagg4s case inferred co-operation
36.
37.
38.
89.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

48.

338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949).
Supra note 34.
United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (1953).
233 Fed. 481 (2d Cir. 1916).
Weeks v. United States, supra note 105; see Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949).
Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 15 L.Ed. 269 (1855).
Supra note 40.
Note, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 121-122 (1957).
"In dozens of cases in my own experience as a Federal prosecutor we had to rely
on the evidence procurred by the unhampered police of the State of New York
or important criminals would have gone free." Statement by Thomas E. Dewey, in

I New York Constitutional Convention, Revised Records 372 (1938), as quoted in
58 Yale L.J. 144, 159, footnote 69.
Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 806, 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 812, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2412-24, as amended
May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 47, 63 Stat. 96.
Act of Feb. 9, 1909, c., 100, § 2 (c), 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended 21 U.S.C. §
173-4 (1952), as amended 21 U.S.C. § 174 (Supp. 1956).
Supra note 39.
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because of the elaborate and carefully prepared plan of search. Shurman
v. United States4 9 represents the opposite extreme. Here the court found
that no co-operation existed, although the evidence revealed the passing
on from the federal officer to the state officer of the information leading
to the unlawful search, a second search by the federal officer some four
hours after the search by the state officer, frequent exchange of information
between state and federal officers, and the turning over of the case to the
federal authorities after the search. 50 In Burdeau v. McDowell5' private
admissible persons stole incriminating papers and delivered them to the federal authorities. It was held this evidence was admissible and that there
was no violation of constitutional provisions, since whatever wrong was
done was that of individuals taking the property of another. Thus the
phrase "illegally obtained" is to be interpreted as "illegally obtained by
law enforcement officers."
It would seem that a state official, stymied in a given case, could
simply violate the law by making an unlawful search, and then turn the
evidence over to the federal courts for prosecution. Such a solution is
limited somewhat by the holding in Gambino v. United States5 2 that where
the search is entirely by state officials, but made solely for the purpose of
aiding the federal officers, the evidence is inadmissible. The Flagg case
also acts as a brake on such a scheme.
IV.

ADMISSIBILITY

IN STATE

COURTS

OF EVIDENCE

ILLEGALLY

OBTAINED BY FEDERAL OFFICERS

There is a difference of opinion in the state courts as to whether the
exclusionary rule keeps out evidence obtained by an unlawful search made
solely by a federal officer, in a criminal prosecution in a state court. Among
the states which admit this evidence are Montana, 53 North Dakota, 54 and
57
56
Tennessee. 55 Against this view are lined Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi,58 Missouri, 59 Texas,6 0 and Wyoming. 61 In the Wyoming case, the
court pointed out that the duty of the state court (as it is in the federal
49.

219 F.2d 282, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921, 75 S.Ct. 661, 99 L.Ed. 1253 (C.A. 5th Tex.

50.

But see Lowrey v. United States, 128 F.2d 477 (C.C.A. 8th 1942), where it appeared
that there was a long-continued and invariably followed practice among state and
federal. officers in illicit liquor cases to tender such cases to the federal officer for
prosecution under the federal law if the case was of sufficient importance. The
fact that the evidence was illegally obtained by state officials would not prevent
its exclusion even though there was no agreement under which the state officers
made the arrests on behalf of the federal officers, and that the arrest in the
particular case was made before the federal officers were advised of it.
256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1920).
275 U.S. 310, 48 S.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927).
State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8,249 Pac. 574 (1926).
See State v. Lacy, 55 N.D. 83, 212 N.W. 442 (1927).
Johnson v. State, 155 Tenn. 628, 299 S.W. 800 (1927).
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927).
Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 250 S.W. 839 (1923).
Lettle v. State, 171 Miss. 818, 159 So. 103 (1935).
State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S.W. 858 (1924).
See Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 334, 58 S.W.2d 829 (1933).
State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 Pac. 2 (1930).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

1955).

Noxs
court) is to uphold the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, and that
if the evidence has been seized unlawfully, and for that reason cannot be
admitted into the federal courts, it cannot be transformed into lawful
evidence by being introduced in a state court.
In the Montana decision 62 admitting such evidence, a federal officer
discovered morphine in a package in the mail. He notified a state officer
who, without a warrant, arrested the persons calling for the package. The
court held the package was admissible as evidence since the violation, if
any, had already occurred without the knowledge or co-operation of the
sheriff. In this respect their reasoning was analogous to that of the federal
courts when evidence had been obtained by persons other than federal
officers.
The holding favoring the admissibility of such evidence may have
much less significance since the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Rea v. United States.63 Here, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four
decision held that a federal court should enjoin a federal officer from
testifying in a state case concerning evidence he had obtained through
an invalid search warrant. This may logically be extended to all types
of evidence obtained unlawfully, and if extended would prohibit the
producing of such evidence by federal officers in any jurisdiction, regardless of the rule followed in that particular jurisdiction. The trend
suggested by the Rea decision is undoubtedly in this direction.
V.

ADMISSIBILITY

IN STATE

CouRTs

OF EVIDENCE

ILLEGALLY

OBTAINED BY STATE OFFICERS

When the federal exclusionary rule was definitely adopted, several
states followed it immediately. Much of this was undoubtedly due to the
number of liquor cases being tried in the courts of the nation. It may be
surmised that because the Prohibition Act was so unpopular, state courts
were disposed to take a lienient view of evidence gained in an "unreasonable search."
Within
the United
followed its
states ". . .
authorities."

a few years after the adoption of the exclusionary rule by
States Supreme Court, 13 states, including Wyoming, had
lead. 64 In support of the rule, the Wyoming court in 1920
it has been generally held by the latest and best reasoned
5

However, all states were not in favor of keeping out this type of
evidence. Many states lined up in opposition to the exclusionary rule.
As one court put it, "an orthodox principle of the common law is that
the admissibility of evidence depends upon its probative value and not
62.
63.
64.
65.

Supra note 53.
350 U.S. 214, 76 S.Ct. 292, 100 L.Ed.. 233 (1956).
Fla., Ill.,
Ind., Ky., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Okla., Tenn., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo.
32 A.L.R. 412 (1934).
State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 217, 194 Pac. 342, 351 (1920).
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upon the method of its procurement." ' 66 The Supreme Court gave the
states the "green light" to use evidence gained in such a manner in Wolf
v. Colorado,6 7 the only limitation being set out in Rochin v. California6"
that it is not admissible if obtained by "conduct that shocks the con69
science."
All jurisdictions, state and federal, are limited by the due process of
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and must for that reason reject
70
confessions made under inducement or duress.
The states which follow the view of federal courts that illegally seized
evidence is inadmissible are California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 71 Those states which admit
illegally obtained evidence are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. 72 The courts in these
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

26 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 521, see Ray, Restrictions on the Use of Illegally Obtained
Evidence, 9 S.W. L.J. 434 (1955).
338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949).
342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).
Ibid at 172.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936); Lisenba v.
Calif., 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935).
People v. Martin, 45 C.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) ; Richards v. State, 45 Del. 573,
77 A.2d 199 (1950); Weiner v. Kelly, 32 So.2d 155 (1955 Fla.); State v. Conner, 59
Idaho 695, 89 P.2d 197 (1939) ; People v. Castree, 311 11. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924) ;
Callender v. State, 136 N.E. 10 (1922 Ind.), mod. on reh. 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E.
817; Parrot v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (1956 Ky.) ; see, People v. Bissonete,
327 Mich. 349, 42 N.W.2d 113 (1950); Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845
280 S.W.2d 37 (1955); State v. Gardner, 74
(1922); State v. Hunt, -_ Mo.
Mont. 377, 240 Pac. 984 (1925) ; State v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. 656, 78 S.E.2d 911
(1953); Humphries v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 319, 235 P.2d 975 (1951) ; State v.
Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922); State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W.
610 (1931); Allen v. State, 161 Tenn. 71, 29 S.W.2d 247 (1930); Tarwater v. State,
160 Tex. Crim. 59, 265 S.W.2d 410 (1954); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash.2d 840, 246 P.2d
480 (1952); State v. Lacy, 118 W. Va. 343, 190 S.E. 344 (1937); Hoyer v. State,
180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923); State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac. 683
(1924).
Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1893); State v. Thomas, 78 Ariz. 52, 275
P.2d 408 (1954) ; see Lane, Smith & Barg v. State, 217 Ark. 114, 229 S.W.2d 43,
reh. denied, 217 Ark. 428, 230 S.W.2d 480 (1950); Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279,
187 P.2d 926 (1947) aff'd, 338 U.S. 25, 91, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 91 L.Ed. 1782; State v.
Zukauskas, 132 Conn. 450, 45 A.2d 289 (1945); Sideh v. State, 91 Ga. App. 387,
85 S.E.2d 610 (1955) ; State ex. rel Kuble v. Bisingnano, 238 Iowa 1060, 28 N.W.2d
504 (1947); State v. Kelley, 125 Kan. 805, 265 Pac. 1109 (1928); State v. Mastricovo, 221 La. 312, 59 So.2d 403 (1952); State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 92 Atl. 867
(1915); Barker v. Warden, 208 Md. 662, 119 A.2d 710 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, 153 N.E. 834 (1926); State v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438, 10
N.W.2d 353 (1943) ; Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 191 .N.W. 721 (1923) ; Terrano
v. State, 59 Nev. 247, 91 P.2d 67 (1939); State v. Mara, 96 N.H. 463, 78 A.2d 922
(1951) ; State v. Lyons, 99 N.J.L. 301, 122 Atl. 758 (1923) ; State v. Bell, 35 N.M. 96,
290 Pac. 739 (1930) ; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270
U.S. 657, 70 L.Ed. 784, 46 S.Ct. 353 (1926); State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67
(1925) ; Browning v. Cleveland, 126 Ohio St. 285, 185 N.E. 55 (1933) ; Commonwealth
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states have used different theories for adopting the common law view of
admissibility. The philosophy of the common law rule is well stated in
Davis v. State, where the Maryland court said:
The question of how evidence is obtained is collateral to
issue or guilt or innocence of the accused, and therefore pertinent evidence no matter how obtained, will be admitted. .... 73
In a few states, the common law rule of admissibility has been modified by statute. For example, in Alabartia the common law rule has been
modified to provide that where the unlawful search is of a private dwelling
for prohibited liquors the evidence thereby gained is inadmissible.7 4 In
Maryland the common law rule applies only to felonies. In that state a
statute commonly known as the Bouse Act makes evidence obtained by
means of an unlawful search and seizure inadmissible in the trial of certain
misdemeanors.5 However, the act specifically excepts a prosecution for
the violation of the narcotics laws, and this exception has been upheld. 7 6
Among the states that follow the federal exclusionary rule, there are
differences in the method of applying it. In Illinois the rule is applied
only to evidence obtained by state officers acting under color of authority
from the state. 77 Some states hold that if the evidence has been unlawfully
obtained by officers of another state, it will be admissible against the
accused.78 This is reminiscent of the federal attitude. In Texas, if the
accused testifies in his own behalf, and admits possession of the articles,
their introduction is not reversible error 79 even though they were illegally
obtained.
As to the general admissibility of evidence obtained by state officers
in state courts, we can again use the broad headings mentioned before in
connection with the federal courts.
(a) Search and Seizure
As in the federal courts, the states which follow the federal rule allow
evidence if it has been obtained incident to a lawful arrest or seized under
a valid search warrant. Some of these states are liberal in their construction of what constitutes a valid search. For example, in Idaho, a
state which follows the federal rule, officers possessed a search warrant
charging the defendant with an abortion offense. They entered the
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v. Tunstall, 178 Pa.Super. 359, 115 A.2d 914 (1955); State v. Olynik, 83 R.I. 31,
113 A.2d 123 (1955); State v.. Addy, 210 S.C. 353, 42 S.E.2d 585 (1947), (But in
Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S.C. 146, the opposite rule was followed, and never has
been expressly overruled or distinguished) ; State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac.
704 (1923) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 AtI. 98 (1934) ; and Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E. 154 (1924).
57 A.2d 289, 289, 189 Md. 640 (1948).
50 A.L.R.2d 536, footnote No. 5 (1956).
Frank v. State, 189 Md. 591, 56 A.2d 810 (1948).
Barr v. Warden, House of Correction, 202 Md. 643, 96 A.2d 494 (1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 839, 74 S.Ct. 62, 98 L.Ed. 360.
361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935).
Kaufman v. State, 189 Tenn. 315, 225 S.W.2d 75 (1949).
Hill v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 248, 212 S.W.2d 143 (1948).
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premises of the defendant while she was in the process of, or had just
completed another abortion, for which she was later tried. It was held that
the evidence seized under the search warrant was admissible against the
defendant even though the search warrant in fact referred to a prior
offense.8 0
The problem of search by an invasion of the body has received more
attention in the state than in the federal courts. In general, the numerical
weight of authority has been that evidence obtained by compulsory physical examinations or tests should be admitted, and that such admittance
does not deprive the accused of any constitutional right.
For example, in State v. Cram,8 1 the defendant was accused of manslaughter in driving while intoxicated. A blood sample was taken from
the accused, after his arrest and while he was unconscious. It was held
that there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination by the introduction into evidence of testimony as to the
presence of alcohol in the blood. Similarly, the privilege against selfincrimination has been held not to be violated by the admission into court
of evidence of blood tests, 8 2 urinalysis,8 3 breath tests,8
85

ings,

4

fingernail scrap-

86
or the results of compulsory mental examinations.

There is authority to the contrary. In State v. Weltha,8 7 a blood
specimen obtained while the defendant was unconscious, but before any
arrest, was held to be an illegal search and seizure.
The majority of decisions in this field do not rely on unlawful or
unreasonable search and seizure as a basis for objecting to this type of
evidence. As may be noted from the preceding cases, the most frequent
objection is that it violates the privilege against self-incrimination and that
this privilege should include tests made upon a person's body against his
will, and not be limited to written or oral testimony.88
(b) Evidence Obtained Through Coercion and Unlawful Detention
As in the federal courts, even a slight inducement held out to a person
charged with a crime renders any confession obtained involuntary. Some
examples of statements made which have been held to be an inducement
sufficient to exclude a confession are given in Brain v. United States,8 9
and quoted in State v. Crank9o as follows:
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State v. Proud, 74 Idaho 429, 262 P.2d 1016 (1953).
Ore.
160 P.2d 283 (1945).
People v. Tucker, 88 Cal.App.2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948).
Toms v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 60, 239 P.2d 812, 816 (1952).
Ibid.
Coleman v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 582, 209 S.W.2d 925 (1948).
Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 27 So.2d 186 (1946).
228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940).
For some aspects of chemical tests to determine drunkeness, see note 4, Wyo. L.J.
103.
168 U.S. 532, 533, 18 S.Ct. 183, 192, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).
105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 188 et Seq. (1943).

NOTES

In Kelly v. State (1882) 72 Ala. 244, saying to the prisoner:
"You have got your foot in it, and somebody else was with you.
Now, if you did break open the door, the best thing you can do is
to tell all about it, and to tell who was with you, and to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth!" In People
v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342, saying to the accused: "It will be better for
you to make a full disclosure .... ." In Green v. State (1891)
88 Ga. 516, 15 S.E. 10, saying to the accused: "Edmund, if you
know anything, it may be best for you to tell it"; or, "Edmund,
if you know anything, go and tell it, and it may be best for
you .... ." In Vaughan v. Comm. (1867) 17 Gratt., Va., 576,
saying to the accused: "You had as well tell all about it."
In State v. Jones,9 1 a Wyoming case where the defendant was charged
with killing her husband, it was held that a statement to the county and
prosecuting attorney was inadmissible because the prosecuting attorney
had falsely told the defendant that her sister and three others disputed
her word, and that her husband was all right, and that he thought it would
go easy on her if she told the truth.
VI.

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

Evidence illegally seized was admissible, at common law, in a criminal
prosecution. In 1914, the United States Supreme Court held that such
evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure by federal officers was
inadmissible in a federal prosecution. Since that time the view has gained
support, and the trend is in that direction. The majority of states still
follow the common law doctrine, under which such evidence is admissible,
but their ranks are diminishing. Today, twenty-seven states favor the common law to twenty-one favoring the federal view.
Since the federal courts already exclude evidence illegally obtained
by federal officers, it would be but a short step to exclude all illegally
obtained evidence whether by federal or by state officers. This result may
be reached in the not-too-distant future.
The principal argument advanced in support of the exclusionary rule
is that it has a specific purpose in furnishing a needed deterrent to illegal
search not otherwise provided for. 92 But the United States Supreme
Court not long ago observed that the rule has not seemed to cut down
on the number of illegal searches. 93 The alternative method of providing
the needed deterrent would be to directly punish the offending officers.
One writer has suggested that this is also ineffective since:
The court will receive the fruits of his unlawful acts, will do
no more than denounce and threaten him with jail or the penitentiary and at the same time,' with tongue in its cheek, give him
to understand how fearful a thing it is to violate the Constitution.9 4
91.

73 Wyo. 122, 276 P.2d 445 (1954).
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Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927).

93.
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Irving v. United States, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954).

Connor Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment, 8 American Bar Association
Journal, 646, 647 (1922).
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It is a strange method of enforcing the law to say that an officer has
broken the law, and that we will punish him by excusing another wrongdoer. This makes society the ultimate loser. It would seem that a better
way to safeguard our constitutional rights would be to provide adequate
sanctions against the officer or official who obtains the evidence through
unlawful means, and trust that the courts which administer the law are
of such caliber that they will no more be inclined to turn their heads at a
violation of this kind than any other violation of the laws of the country.
HAROLD

E.

MEIER

THE ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF THE COSTS
OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN WYOMING
Several states, including Wyoming, have enacted statutes which allow
the court to assess certain costs in a criminal prosecution if the defendant
is found guilty. At common law, costs as such were unknown in criminal
cases,1 therefore the basis for such assessment is statutory, and there can
be no liability for costs of prosecution in the absence of such authoriza2
tion.
A number of jurisdictions have advanced reasons why the costs of
prosecution should be assessed against the guilty party. An Arkansas
Court pointed out that the imposition of these costs is not intended as
part of the punishment, but it is a means of forcing the guilty to bear the
expense of their prosecution, rather than forcing the county or state to
bear such expense. 3 The Wyoming Supreme Court apparently agrees
4
with the Arkansas Court, for it said in Arnold v. State:
If we concede as we are inclined to do, that there is merit in the
philosophy that a convicted criminal should not be completely
relieved from paying certain items of the overall expense incident
to his being successfully prosecuted, that is a matter for legislative
rather than judicial determination....
At an earlier day Justice Stone of the Alabama Court took a somewhat
different view. He compared the liability for costs with such duties as
5
serving on a jury or posse.
There are two statutes in the State of Wyoming governing the assess1.
2.
3.
4

5.

Saunders v. People, 63 Colo. 241, 165 Pac. 781 (1917) ; Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34,
134 Pac. 260 (1913), reh. denied, 135 Pac. 749.
State v. Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210 Pac. 756 (1922).
Edwards v. State, 12 Ark. 122 (1850).
.
Wyo ....
306 P.2d 368, 377 (1957).
Lee v. State, 75 Ala. 29 (1883).
"Certain duties are cast on all citizens for the
welfare of society; to serve on juries, to work the public roads, to testify as witnesses, to act as a posse comitatus, when thereto lawfully summoned, and when a
citizen, by his own misconduct, expose himself to the punitive powers of the law,
the expense incident to his prosecution and conviction, each and all of these may
result in subjecting the defaulter to a money liability."

